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Non-technical summary
To fight long-term unemployment in Germany, a new promotional program by the
German Federal government started in October 1994 – “Guidelines for the
promotion of reintegrating the hard-to-place unemployed by means of loans and
subsidies to Temporary Employment Agencies”. The programme that was limited to
the period from 10/01/94 to 12/31/96, aimed at integrating unemployed people with
reintegration difficulties into the primary labour market. The subsidies granted by
the programme resulted in an increased trend towards “non-profit temping”, which
on the one hand led to the formation of new non-profit temp agencies and on the
other hand led to an extension of the activities of a number of existing non-profit
organisations.
Institutions engaged in “non-profit temping” have the explicit aim of facilitating the
reintegration of unemployed into the primary labour market. To achieve this, they
employ previously unemployed people and hire them out to other firms (borrowers)
for a fee. While commercial lenders are generally not interested in losing good
workers to the borrowers, the “non-profit temping” represents a new instrument
linking the labour lending activity with the aim of reintegration into the primary
labour market. Ideally, the temp worker will be hired permanently by the customer
of the temp agency (borrower) and thus reintegrated into the primary labour market.
The paper presents an econometric assessment of the effects of non-profit temporary
employment agencies in Rhineland-Palatinate on individual labour market success.
That is, the paper focuses on the question whether previously unemployed people,
who were employed by a non-profit temp agency, show a higher rate of
reintegration into the primary labour market than without „non-profit temping“. It is
based on data of the German Federal Employment Services made available from
files for computer-assisted job brokering. Using the computer-assisted job
brokering-data and econometric matching methods, a control group of unemployed
workers is selected that resembles the group of temporary workers in terms of their
socio-economic structure and labour market history.
The econometric comparison of the reintegration success reveals differences
between temporary workers and control group. In our observation window (up to 5
months after leaving a temp agency), the reintegration success of temp workers was
significantly higher than that of the control group. For example, two months after
leaving the temp agencies, 27.4 % of the temp workers were employed in the
primary labour market compared to only 11.3 % in the control group of non-temps
after the same period. Furthermore temp workers stay approx. 15 days longer in the
labour market within the first four months after leaving the temp agency.
For a comprehensive evaluation of the programme in question, more extensive
analyses would be required that should include other direct impacts (for example on
earnings; on longer term impacts; on participants’ reduced use of social welfare
etc.), indirect impacts (for example, on non-participants and through the forgone use
of the money invested) and the longer perspective of the non-profit temp agencies in
the evaluation. This task, however, is closely related to the need of better data.
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1Introduction
To fight long-term unemployment in Germany, in October 1994 a new promotional
programme by the German Federal government started – “Guidelines for the
promotion of reintegrating the hard-to-place unemployed by means of loans and
subsidies to Temporary Employment Agencies” (GPTA).1 The programme that was
limited to the period from 10/01/94 to 12/31/96, aimed at integrating unemployed
people with reintegration difficulties into the primary labour market.2 The subsidies
granted by the programme resulted in an increased trend towards “non-profit
temping” (NPT), which on the one hand led to the formation of new non-profit temp
agencies (NPTAs) and on the other hand led to an extension of the activities of a
number of existing non-profit organisations. In this paper we assess the direct
impact of these NPTAs on individual labour market success. That is the paper
focuses on the question whether previously unemployed people who were employed
by a NPTA show a higher rate of reintegration into the primary labour market than
without NPT.
Institutions engaging in NPT have the explicit aim of facilitating the reintegration of
unemployed into the primary labour market. To achieve this, they employ
previously unemployed people and hire them to other firms in return for a fee.
While commercial lenders are generally not interested in losing good workers to
their customers, the NPT represents a new instrument linking the labour lending
activity with the aim of reintegration into the primary labour market. Ideally, the
temp worker (TW) will be hired permanently by the customer of the temp agency
and thus reintegrated into the primary labour market.
This new instrument of active labour market policies (ALMP) is related to two
general developments in Germany. One was the further rise in unemployment and
especially long-term unemployment after the recession in 1992/93, the other,
deregulation of labour market institutions. Specifically, the so-called “placement
monopoly” of the Federal Employment Services (FES) was abolished in 1994.
                                          
1 "Richtlinien zur Förderung der Eingliederung schwervermittelbarer Arbeitsloser durch Darlehen
und Zuschüsse an Gesellschaften zur Arbeitnehmerüberlassung, AüGRi".
2 In Germany “A person is considered hard-to-place (have integration difficulties) when one or
more hindrances to placement exist, e.g. serious disability, a lack or a low level of vocational
qualifications, age (usually at least 50 years old), health-related limitations, a longer period of
unemployment (at least one year) or personal reasons on part of the job seeker.” (Walwei, 1998:
20). The terms hard-to-place or hard-to-employ are not used internationally in a similar way; see
for concepts and problems with this terms Erhel et al. (1996).
2Furthermore some rather restrictive regulations in the legal framework of temporary
employment agencies have been relaxed.
There is a rich literature on evaluations of ALMP.3 A large part of this literature
deals with the impact of publicly financed training or employment providing
programmes.4 A policy programme comparable to the German one investigated here
has, to the best of our knowledge, not been in use in another country.5 While the
details of NPT appear to be rather unique, from its aims and procedures, it can at
best be compared to programmes that aim at providing temporary work experience
(work habit) for disadvantaged persons.6 The main difference is that these
programmes usually do not subsidise agencies. Instead they subsidise the wages of
the disadvantaged or provide temporary jobs in public or private firms.7 In the U.K.
the “Employment Action” programme provides participants with subsidised
employment in non-profit or public sector jobs. This programme had an estimated
net effect of 4 % on employment rates (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999: Table
10.7). In France, the “Travaux d’Utilité Collective” had a positive short term impact
on the probability of finding a new job for young, lower skilled people (Bonnal,
Fougère and Sérandon, 1994, 1997).
The structure of this paper is as follows: In section 2 the general concept of temp
agencies is explained in greater detail, followed by a description of the
characteristics of the respective NPTA under consideration. Section 3 discusses the
special characteristics and problems associated with the data. Section 4 contains
                                          
3 For recent surveys see Friedlander, Greenberg and Robins (1997), Heckman, LaLonde and
Smith (1999) and OECD (1996).
4 See for Germany Eichler and Lechner (1998), Kraus, Puhani and Steiner (1997) as well as
Lechner (1999a) and the literature cited therein.
5 Maybe with the exception of the Netherlands, where a public NPTA was founded called START
(see de Koning, Denys and Walwei, 1998), which has become commercial now. We are not
aware of an econometric evaluation of START. Job placements according to the so-called
“Maatwerk”-method in the Netherlands have comparable aims. Commercial agencies get
premia for a successful placement. This method has also recently (January 1998) been
introduced in Germany for the hard-to-place persons and lasts currently until the end of 1999.
6 This belongs to the second group of five policies discussed in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith
(1999: 15), called “subsidized employment with public or private employers”. A comparison
with the results of evaluations of US-programmes is however difficult, because these studies are
as a rule more interested in income or wage effects. For an overview and discussion of policy
measures designed for hard-to-place persons cf. Erhel et al. (1996).
7 Examples of direct public job creation programmes: “Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen” in
Germany, “Employment Action” programme in the United Kingdom since 1991, “Travaux
d’Utilité Collective” in France, cf. Erhel et al. (1996).
3methodological considerations and explains the econometrics. The results are
discussed in section 5. Section 6 summarises and concludes. The Appendix gives
some additional information on how the information in the coArb is turned into a
data set that can be analysed by econometric methods.
1 The Concept of Non-profit Temp Agencies in Germany
1.1 Temping agencies in Germany
The terms “temp work”, “labour lending” and “personnel leasing” refer all to a
mode of employment that differs in one central aspect from standard employment.
While standard employment can be understood as a relationship between two
parties (employee and employer) in which a working and employment relationship
coincide, the hiring out of labour is a trilateral concept (employee, lender and
borrower) in which the working relationship and the employment relationship are
separated (for more details on the institutions see Almus et. al., 1999). In the temp
work business, it is the temping agency that acts as the employer having a contract
with the TW. The lender hires out his TW for “use” to a third party – the borrowing
enterprise. Terms and conditions of this hiring out (hiring out duration, fee etc.) are
specified in a lending contract. The attractiveness of providing temporary work for
the agency lies in the lending fees payable to it. The borrower saves personnel costs
for various reasons.
In Germany this sector is regulated by the Law on Labour Lending. This legislation
permits hiring out of employees because it is expected that several temporary or
limited working relationships with borrowing enterprises lead to extended or even
permanent employment. As the majority of temp agencies in Germany are run by
commercial enterprises (see Walwei, 1998), the initial aspirations of the legislation
regarding reintegration of temporary employees into normal employment
relationships were not fulfilled. Commercial temp agencies are not interested in
losing their good-performing employees to their customers since these good-
performing TWs are the basis for the economic success of the agency.
Due to the constant high unemployment in the nineties, the original form of
employee hiring out was rediscovered and modified as a policy instrument. The
already implicit objective of temp agencies, the brokering of labour, was now made
the explicit aim of a new model of reintegration-oriented employee hiring out. The
aim is two-fold: Firstly, by being hired, unemployed people should get re-
accustomed to work. Secondly, enterprises should be encouraged to provide
opportunities to those unemployed people who belong to problem groups. The
possibility to employ members of these groups risk-free and without any legal
commitment, i.e. reversible at any time, shall give decision-makers in companies a
4comparatively cheap opportunity to find out both the potential and capabilities of
these unemployed people for themselves. When the temp agency generates profits,
those profits should be used for further education and training of the TWs in times
when they are not hired out.
GPTA was supported with 51 million German Marks by the federal government
limited to the period 1994 to 1996. The funds were granted as subsidies or interest-
free loans and exclusively accessible to those temping agencies that committed
themselves that at least a quarter of their TWs were hard-to-place unemployed.
GPTA was not only directed towards existing commercial agencies. Other
corporations could also engage in lending of TWs, e.g. incorporated associations
and non-profit agencies that comply with the required prerequisite of reintegration
problems can be eligible for subsidisation. When the guidelines took effect there
were about 65 NPTAs in Germany. Then the sector expanded in form of start-ups
and extension of the business of already existing non-profit organisations. The total
number of companies subsidised by the GPTA programme in Germany was 105, of
which 90 were non-profit organisations. The strong majority of non-profit
organisations suggests that the programme raised only little interest with
commercial agencies.8
1.2 The agencies under investigation
In this study the work of eight NPTAs in Rhineland-Palatinate are examined (see
Table 1). Information on the agencies is based on an analysis of a written survey
and on comprehensive interviews, which we conducted with representatives of each
agency. Regarding the concept of the project and the organisation and design of the
contractual relationships with the customers and TWs, there are differences between
the agencies with respect to the size of the agency, the proportion of people with
reintegration problems and the coverage of costs resulting from lending activities.
The number of employees in the agencies ranges between 24 and 243 TWs during
the two years under investigation.
The agencies were only subsidised by the GPTA programme if at least 25 % of their
employees (respectively unemployed) fulfilled the criterion of having reintegration
                                          
8 An important reason for this is certainly the different treatment of both types of agencies. While
NPTAs received subsidies, commercial agencies were usually only granted interest-free loans
that could partly be transformed into subsidies for those TWs with reintegration problems
becoming permanently employed with the borrowers (see Vanselow and Weinkopf, 1997).
However, this way of support appeared not to be sufficient to stimulate commercial temp
agencies to increase the share of unemployed with reintegration problems.
5problems. Of course, this criterion was met by all agencies used for this study. In
fact the share was between 34 % and 96 %.9
At the reference date on 12/31/96 (end of public GPTA-support), 211 TWs were still
employed by the companies. 219 of 832 were employed, 317 were unemployed
immediately after the end of the programme; of the remaining participants, three
worked as self-employed, 29 entered a qualification programme (re-education,
further education etc.), one person has been receiving old-age pension, and the
status of 52 people is unknown.
Table 1: NPTAs in the regions of Rhineland-Palatinate: number of TWs, share of problem
groups and labour market indicators
Region/ city TWs Problem group Unemployment Unemployment rate
NPTA per cent* 1996 1996 1994
Speyer 243 34 3350 8.2 7.3
Ludwigshafen 82 72 9460 9.4 8.4
Frankenthal 155 54 2953 9.7 8.0
Simmern 198 68 2685 11.1 10.1
Trier 1 63 51
Trier 2 42 81
5911 10.0 8.9
Boppard 24 96 1245 7.8 6.8
Koblenz 25 84 4774 8.3 7.0
Rhineland-P. 832 67 149,781 9.4 8.4
Source: ZEW, Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (different issues), own calculations; * hard-
to-place unemployed as share of all TWs at respective NPTA.
Between 1995 and 1996 the NPTAs received 3.2 millions German Marks in
subsidies for staff and equipment from the Federal Employment Services. Table 1
shows that the size of the activities of the NPTAs compared to the number of
unemployed in the regions where they are operating is rather small. That is true,
even if one restricts the comparison to the group of hard-to-place persons, which is
roughly about one third on average.
Regional unemployment rates differ due to differences in the industrial composition
and the socio-economic structure of the workforce. Unemployment rates have risen
during the observation periods in all regions, indicating job losses in the industry as
                                          
9 See Almus et al. (1999). A higher proportion of unemployed with reintegration difficulties
results in higher costs of finding jobs and less frequent hiring out. The contributions from the
hiring out activities covered between 35 % and 93 % of the costs running the temp agency. The
cost share is negatively correlated with the number of unemployed with reintegration
difficulties. When the funds from GPTA were no longer available, agencies tried to rise the
proportion of coverage from hiring out activities.
6well as a rise in the supply of workers, mainly due to immigration from East
European countries.
2 Data
2.1 Introductory remarks
The econometric assessment of the reintegration success is based on the group of
TWs and a non-experimental comparison group of unemployed not participating in a
temp agency, drawn from the computer-assisted job brokering data (called
“coArb”10) for four regional departments of the FES (called “employment office
districts”). The data include all unemployed with respect to the reference day
12/31/96 (the day at which coArb-data were extracted), from the employment office
districts of Koblenz, Bad-Kreuznach, Ludwigshafen, and Trier, where all NPTA
under investigations are located.
For the purpose of assessing labour market policies, comprehensive information on
labour market relevant characteristics is needed that is fully available for both the
programme participants (the TWs) and the non-participants (the comparison group).
In view of these requirements, the use of the coArb as database for an evaluation of
the reintegration-oriented hiring out of employees has the following advantages:
Since most TWs were registered as unemployed before the programme started, it
was possible to find them in the coArb by a comparison with the information
resulting from the interviews at the agencies, e.g. name, date of birth. At the same
time, all other unemployed people registered in the coArb-database can be used as
potential comparison observations. Thus, we have a uniform basis of information
for both TWs and comparison group.
coArb contains standard information on personal characteristics and skills. It also
contains the following information on employment histories of registered
unemployed and employment seekers, mostly stating daily dates:
• Earlier employment relationships (information on the job performed and the
employer);
• Periods of previous unemployment, illness and some other events;
• Participation in other programmes of ALMP;
                                          
10 The coArb is used in all 181 German employment office districts in a standardised, but
decentralised form. With the exception of the information on job openings, typically, the data
used in one employment office district is not accessible beyond its borders. The offices within
employment office districts are linked, however.
7• Reporting failures (“Meldeversäumnisse”) by the unemployed (unemployed have
to come to the office on a regular basis, otherwise it is a reporting failure);
• Periods in which the employment office had no information on the whereabouts
of the registered person.
The use of the coArb has also its limitations that stem from the way the data base is
managed. For example after the termination of the ”reactivation period”, which
starts with the day of unregistration from the coArb11 and generally lasts 10 month,
the data of the observed person will automatically be deleted by the computer
system. People having entered a programme earlier than 10 months before the
reference day and who do not register with the employment office again, cannot be
found any more in the coArb. In contrast TWs who have entered a NPTA earlier than
03/01/96 and who become unemployed again within the 10 months preceding the
reference date, can be found in the coArb.
Thus, the possibility of finding a person in the coArb is closely tied to the
successful reintegration of that person. In order to prevent a distortion of the
evaluation of the reintegration success by (negative) selection effects, the analysis is
restricted to those TWs who entered the programme not earlier then 10 month before
the reference day. A further problem of the coArb is that due to its customisation for
the requirements of the labour brokering, numerous information are only available
in the form of unencoded data, i.e. in the form of text fields. This affects primarily
the data on the employment history that are of special importance for the formation
of comparison groups. To make these data usable for a statistical analysis requires a
non-automatic and thus time-consuming reorganisation.
Apart from legal restrictions due to data protection laws in Germany, the above
mentioned difficulties are probably the main reason why the coArb has hardly been
used so far for scientific purposes, although it is in many respects superior to the
data typically used for econometric evaluations in Germany.
2.2 The selection of the sample
When questioning the agencies, information on 832 TWs were collected. From
these, 134 people were suitable for an estimate of their reintegration success. The
                                          
11 Unregistration from the coArb is carried out when the unemployed finds a job or the way into a
NPTA. Apart from that there is a great number of other reasons for an unregistration, e.g. a
second reporting failure, illness, entering further education or leaving the labour market. The
unregistration of applicants that reregister with the employment office within the reactivation
period are deactivated.
8reasons for this reduction are the following: Only those TWs can be included into
the evaluation for whom information from the coArb database can be used. For 227
people this is not the case, because they are either not from one of the four
employment office districts whose coArb data were available for this study (70), or
because they were deleted from the database after expiration of their reactivation
period (67), or because they were not registered at the employment office at all and
obtained their employment with an agency in another way (90). In addition the part
of the coArb database of the employment office district of Koblenz containing the
information on the employment histories is not available (23). Therefore all further
analyses are based exclusively on the coArb data of the employment office districts
of Bad-Kreuznach, Ludwigshafen, and Trier. 582 TWs remained. These people
could be traced in the regional coArb database by comparing their name and date of
birth with the information from the questionnaire.
Judging from the standard 10-month reactivation period persons who entered
employment with an agency earlier than 10 months before the reference day, only
those could be found in the coArb database who were recorded again at the
employment office after 02/29/96, i.e. who had become unemployed again.
However, those TWs that had directly entered the primary labour market after their
employment by a temp agency and stayed there could no longer be traced.
Unemployed having entered their employment relationship with a temp agency
before the 03/01/96 which can be found again in the coArb database as per 12/31/96
are therefore likely to be systematically less successful in their reintegration into the
primary labour market. If this consideration is not taken into account, there will be
the danger of underestimating the effect of the programme.
Even in the event that TWs who were employed by an agency earlier than the
03/01/96 and passed into the primary labour market after leaving the agency could
be found again in the coArb database, their inclusion into the evaluation would not
be advisable, because it is not possible to trace potential comparison group members
in the coArb entering the primary labour market before 03/01/96 and remaining
there beyond 12/31/96. Thus the estimated effect of the programme could be
positively biased.
The mentioned selection problems created by the 10-month period are circumvented
by the limitation of the sample to people who entered the programme after 02/29/96.
If it is also taken into account that the reintegration effect can only be determined
for completed programmes, and that the unemployed must therefore have left the
agency before the 12/31/96, the sample reduces to 175 observation.
In the last step, unemployed are excluded who are younger than 18 or older than 53
years. This is done partly to restrict the survey to adults, and partly to exclude
9people whose participation may be directly linked to early retirement. Furthermore,
those people are excluded with two or more independent stays in an agency, or with
a stay of less than eight days. Very short stays are rarely accompanied by
sustainable effects and several independent stays should be analysed separately,
which is not possible due to a lack of cases. This last step reduces the number of
observations to 134.
The limitation of the sample to people having been employed by an agency between
the 03/01/96 and the 12/31/96 in order to avoid selection-related distortions might
be achieved at the cost of a new potential selection problem. Less successful TWs,
who entered a NPTA after the 03/01/96 and stayed there beyond 12/31/96 are
excluded from the analysis, with the possible consequence of the reintegration
success being overestimated. We regard this distortion as minor, because the
duration of the employment with an agency as such is not an indicator for a later
success of the TW in the primary labour market. Both for short and for long-term
programmes, there is a positive as well as a negative interpretation of their
relationship with the further employment history. Short stays may be due either to a
quick transition of the TW to the primary labour market, but also to a dismissal of
the TW by the agency (e.g. unsuitability of the TW or a lack of appropriate demand
by customers). Long-term stays can either be the consequence of difficulties to
reintegrate the TW into the primary labour market or be due to the fact that an
agency holds on to a person who is a valuable contribution to business success.
2.3 Descriptive analysis
The participation in active labour market programmes is not accidental. On the one
hand such programmes are targeted explicitly towards specific (problem) groups. In
the case of the NPT it is particularly the group of unemployed with reintegration
difficulties that is intended to be supported. On the other hand, only some of the
people being eligible actually participate.
The comparison of the mean values of selected socio-economic and demographic
characteristics between the TWs and the pool of all persons registered in the coArb
highlights striking differences (cf. Table 2). The second column shows descriptive
statistics for the “population”, i.e. 144,002 unemployed or employment seekers
registered in one of the three employment office districts as per 12/31/96. The third
column contains descriptive statistics for 582 TWs found in the databases, and the
fourth column lists the 134 TWs forming the basis for the estimation. The selection
of the characteristics shown in Table 2 is made according to the relevance of the
respective variable for the evaluation and according to whether the information is
already available in encoded form in the coArb database.
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In comparison to all unemployed, TWs are younger, more often male and severely
disabled but less frequently with impaired health, more often foreigners and more
often former expatriate Germans relocated from Eastern Europe. Regarding the
level of schooling and vocational training, TWs turn out to be skilled below average.
These numbers seem to be consistent with the promotional concept customised for
unemployed with reintegration difficulties. Despite some deviations between
columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 for the variables ”single”, ”foreigner”, ”relocated
expatriate” and ”unskilled worker”, that may be attributable to random sampling
error, both samples of TWs appear to be more or less similar.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of selected variables for three samples
Samples CoArb TWs found incoArb Selected TWs
Observations 144,002 582 134
Variables Mean (std)or share in %
Mean (std)
or share in %
Mean (std)
or share in %
Age 37.9 (12.8) 35.6 (10.3) 32.8 (9.3)
Gender (male) 60.1 77.5 77.6
Marital status
single 37.4 38.7 44.0
not single 9.7 11.4 6.0
married 52.1 49.6 50.0
single parent 0.8 0.3 0.0
Number of children 0.4 (0.9) 0.6 (1.0) 0.5 (0.9)
Severely disabled 5.3 7.0 6.7
With impaired health 27.1 21.5 22.4
With impaired health influencing the reintegration
success 15.3 11.2 11.9
Foreigner 10.9 12.2 17.2
Relocated expatriate from Eastern Europe 5.9 16.0 12.7
Schooling / degree
secondary school (9 years), no degree 11.7 17.3 17.9
secondary school (9 years) 63.0 65.6 62.7
O-levels (10 years) 13.5 10.0 11.2
A-levels or qualification for vocational
college (more than 11 years) 11.8 7.1 8.2
Vocational training / degree
No degree 45.4 52.7 54.5
Apprenticeship 45.4 41.7 39.6
Vocational school 4.3 3.3 2.2
Vocational college / polytechnic 1.5 0.9 0.7
University 3.4 1.5 3.0
Desired occupation on 2-digit-level* 61.4 (24.7) 51.7 (24.4) 52.3 (22.3)
Occupation in last employment
unskilled worker 22.5 36.8 50.7
skilled worker 13.6 10.9 7.5
clerical staff 18.6 6.6 5.2
others 45.3 45.8 36.6
Employment office district
Bad Kreuznach 31.2 23.7 13.4
Ludwigshafen 32.9 59.6 64.2
Trier 35.9 16.7 22.4
Source: coArb Bad-Kreuznach, Ludwigshafen and Trier; own calculations. *This is not a metric variable.
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While the variables listed in Table 2 are contained in encoded form in the coArb
database, the information on the employment histories are available only in the form
of text entries (cf. Table A1) that are not suitable for automated processing without
losing too much information. As employment history data are crucial for the
evaluation exercise, a manual processing of that data was carried out.
For the purpose of using these day specific information in the econometric
estimation in an operational way, a time framework was used that was put together
from 61 reference dates of the observation period from 12/31/89 to 12/31/96 (cf.
Table A2). The distance between the reference dates increases with the distance
from 12/31/96, so that the more recent employment history is more precisely
recorded. The idea is that the more recent history is a more important component of
the selection process into NPT than the more distant past (see Appendix for more
details).
Time is measured in “half-months”. The range of values of the initial and the final
date of the programme is restricted to the half-months 1 to 19 (03/01/96 to
12/31/96, cf. Table A2) and the range of values of the duration which the
unemployed stayed in the programme to 19 half-months. The first TWs entered the
programme before 03/16/96; the last entries took place after 12/16/96. The earliest
exits took place between the 16th and the 29th of April 1996. The latest exits were
observed between the 16th and the 31th of December 1996. 90 % of the participants
observed entered the programme before 10/16/96 and ended it before 12/16/96. 90
% of the participants can therefore be observed at least two half-months after the
end of their participation. Half of the participants can be observed up to eight half-
months after leaving the programme.
Approximately 70 % of the employment relationships with temp agencies have
lasted no more than three months, and about 90 % had a duration of up to 10 half-
months (cf. Figure 1). The sharp decline of the employment duration in the first half
of the observation period indicates that the NPT is not designed as a permanent
employment relationship, but as a transitional solution. All statements on the
success of NPT refer to the short period of two up to ten half-months after the
termination of the employment relationship with the temp agencies. Further
statements on medium- and long-term effects are not possible.
Figure 2 reveals information about the employment status of the TWs before and
after the programme. The upper part of the figure depicts the development of the
percentage of unemployed, in the lower part that of the employed. In view of the
fact that participation in NPT is generally linked to prior unemployment it comes as
no surprise that the proportion of the employed NPT one period before the start of
the programme lies at 0 % and the respective proportion of unemployed lies at
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almost 100 %. Striking is the sudden downward bend of both graphs by 10 % each
immediately before the start of the programme. An explanation may be that the
labour administration wants to help especially new entrants into unemployment to
find quickly a new job.
Figure 1: Duration of stay in NPTA
Source: Own calculations based on the processed employment histories.
After leaving the NPTA, 18.7 % of the TWs were employed, corresponding to the
level of 10 half-month periods before entering the programme. The share rises to a
level of more than 25 %. While the result of one period after leaving the NPTA is
based upon all 134 observations, in period 5 only 100 people are observed. In
period 7 finally it is 75 and in period 10 - that is 10 half-months after the respective
termination of the programme - 38 people are left. Blaschke and Nagel (1995)
calculated 3-4 month reintegration rates after training programmes according to the
Law on the Promotion of Employment ("Arbeitsförderungsgesetz") in the old
German federal states of 46.5 % that are higher than in our study. One is tempted to
say that the new programme is less successful than the traditional training
programmes.
However, such a conclusion based on the so-called ”Before-After-Comparison” is
premature because it does not take into account potential peculiarities of the
respective groups of participants. To get a better estimate of the effect of this
programme, we select a comparison group of unemployed from the coArb who have
not been employed by a NPTA so far, but are otherwise as similar as possible to the
TWs.
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Figure 2: Employment status of TWs before and after their stay in NPTA
Source: Own calculations based on reorganised and processed employment histories.
3 Econometric evaluation of the reintegration success
3.1 Methods of evaluation
The method to be used for an evaluation depends among other things on the data
available. If the data stem from a social experiment, the demanded comparability of
participants in the programme and non-participants is given by the design of the
experiment. Then, the average causal effect of the programme can be estimated as
the difference of the target values between the group of participants and the
randomised non-participants.
In a non-experimental setting participants might differ systematically from the
group of potential comparison observations. However, these differences are
correlated with the participation success due to “self-selection“ or “programme
selection“. Two ways to get an undistorted effect of the programme have been
proposed in the literature: The so-called parametric method is based on a more or
less complete, i.e. parametric or semi-parametric modelling of both the procedure of
selecting the participants and the process that determines the outcome. A
disadvantage of these methods is that some technical assumptions regarding error
terms and functional forms are required that do not always have a behavioural
background and might lead to biased results if not correct.
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More recently non-parametric identifying assumptions and corresponding non-
parametric estimation methods are used. Due to the fact that the coArb represents a
large and informative pool of comparison and participating observations we will use
a non-parametric evaluation approach in the following. With respect to estimation,
matching methods are used (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1998). "Matched
sampling is a method for selecting units from a large reservoir of potential
comparisons to produce a comparison group of modest size in which the
distribution of covariates is similar to the distribution in the treated group"
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983: 48). In other words, matching can be referred to as a
method that selects those people from a group of potential comparison observations
who match the participants as closely as possible in terms of the variables driving
the selection process.
3.2 Econometrics
The central question of our analysis is the causal effect of participation in NPT on
the later employment status of the TW. The concept of the causal effect was
formulated by Rubin (1974), who put it this way: “The causal effect of a measure
for a specific person is the difference between the likely outcome of a person's
participation in a measure and the likely outcome of a person's non-participation.“
(Rubin 1974: 689). The latter is not observable, as a person cannot be participant
and non-participant at the same time. Under certain conditions, to be explained in
the following, the average causal effect of the programme on the people who have
actually participated in the programme (θ 0 ) can be calculated. The average causal
effect can be expressed in the following way:
)1|()1|()1|(:0 =−===−= SYESYESYYE ntntθ ,          (1)
whereas E  stands for the expectation operator and S  is an indicator variable for the
participation status that is one for the participants and zero for the non-participants.
Y t  (Y n ) measures the employment status after a participation (non-participation) in
the programme. Y t  and Y n  are also referred to as potential outcomes because they
are defined independently of the individuals realised state. The use of the concept of
potential outcomes takes into account the above mentioned impossibility to observe
people both as participants and non-participants (Y n  can never be observed for
participants, Y t  can never be observed for non-participants).
The difficulty of determining the average causal effect from Equation (1) comes
from the problems of identifying )1|( =SYE n , as Y n  cannot be observed for
participants; in contrast, E Y St( | )= 1  can be estimated as arithmetic average of the
various employment states of the participants after the programme. In the case of an
experiment in which the access to a programme is regulated within the group of
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potentially entitled people by means of a random selection mechanism, the group of
entitled non-participants ( S = 0 ) could be used to estimate E Y Sn( | )= 1 . It is already
clear from Table 2 that participants and non-participants differ in a systematic
manner. Hence, we expect that )0|()1|( =≠= SYESYE nn , meaning that E Y Sn( | )= 1
cannot be estimated unbiasedly as arithmetic average from the employment status of
non-participants observed after the programme.
Instead of assuming random participation like in an experiment the conditional
independence assumption (CIA), meaning that participation and potential outcome
are independent for individuals with the same set of characteristics ( xX = ), is more
attractive (Rubin 1977, cf. Equation 2).
Y S X xn⊥ =| . (2)
CIA is only plausible if all important variables influencing Y n  and S are known and
observed. For this reason an empirical analysis requires both a detailed knowledge
on the participation process and sufficiently informative data. In our view, the
coArb represents data that contain all relevant information either in direct or in
indirect form and ensures that CIA holds. If CIA is correct, the equality
E Y S X x E Y S X xn n( | , ) ( | , )= = = = =1 0  holds. This means that, by using a group of non-
participants whose distribution of exogenous variables does not differ from the one
of the group of participants, E Y Sn( | )= 1  can be consistently estimated, allowing a
determination of the average causal effect of the programme.
To ensure the correctness of CIA in general a large number of exogenous variables
is necessary. As a consequence X  has a high dimension, which means that a non-
parametric estimate of E Y Sn( | )= 1  becomes much more difficult. In order to avoid
this dimensionality problem, the vector x  can be condensed to a scalar measure, the
so-called propensity score. The propensity score ( p x( ) ) is defined as the probability
of participating in a programme conditional on X ( p x P S X x( ) ( | )= = =1 ). Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) show that if CIA is valid, then conditioning on the propensity
score is sufficient to guarantee the statistical independence between potential
outcome and participation status.
The disadvantage of the propensity score is that it is not available as a variable in
the data and thus has to be estimated. Since conditioning on p(x) as well as on x
leads to conditional independence, it is clear that conditioning on terms like
(p(x),f(x)) (balancing scores) is also sufficient, whatever the form of the function f(.)
is. In practise f(.) is formed in a way that some components of X are excluded. In
econometric applications – and thus also in the context of this analysis – mostly
balancing scores are used which are such a mixture.
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3.3 Preselection
For economical reasons it was not possible to reorganise and process the individual
employment histories available in the coArb databases, which were not encoded but
had the form of plain texts, for all the 144,000 unemployed. Instead a sample had to
be selected that could be processed, but which was at the same time big enough to
enable a high matching quality. The goal of the preselection process was to find 15
comparison observations for each participant based on a reduced information set.
The preselection was based on a simple matching procedure. A probit model for
participation in the programme was estimated for calculating the participation
probability based on all potential comparison observations plus the 134 TWs
suitable for evaluation. The first column of Table 2 contains the variables used in
this step. The following variables are significant at the 5 % level:
• Age;
• Sex;
• Employment office district;
• Severe disablement;
• Occupation in the last employment relationship;
• Relocated expatriate from Eastern Europe.
In the next step those persons were selected as potential comparisons who are
identical to the respective participant with respect to the values of the above listed
significant variables. For participants for whom less than 15 ”identical” comparison
persons are available in the data the missing observations were determined with the
nearest-neighbour method. That is, those persons are selected who’s propensity
score shows the smallest absolute difference to the respective participant.12 After
this, the employment histories of the 2010 selected comparisons are reorganised and
processed according to a procedure presented in the Appendix. Thus, the sample,
that is the basis for the subsequent analyses (in the following referred to as ”data set
2”), contains 134 + 2,010 = 2,144 persons.
3.4 Selection of the comparison group
After the reconstruction of the employment histories, “data set 2” contains in
addition to the variables used so far 61 time-related indicator variables for the
                                          
12 The pre-selection is not expected to create statistical independence between participation status
and potential results for the group of non-participants. In this phase of the analysis, the CIA
cannot be fulfilled, as the information from the employment histories are not available yet.
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analysis of the causal reintegration effect for each of the following events in the
employment histories:
1. Times of unemployment;
2. Occupation during employment, differentiated according to 5 categories;
3. Education, differentiated according to school, apprenticeship, vocational
school, technical school, university;
4. Participation in ALMP, differentiated according to further education, re-
education, rehabilitation and work creation programmes (“Arbeits-
beschaffungsmaßnahmen”), but without NPT;
5. Entry into and time in the NPT.
6. Periods without record in the coArb;
7. Illness;
8. Service in the armed forces, periods in social services;
9. Imprisonment;
10. Periods prior to the recording of the employment history by the
employment office.
Moreover, variables for the frequency of the first and second failure to report to the
employment office (“Meldeversäumnisse”) of the years 1994, 1995 and 1996 as
well as for the highest finished vocational training are available.
The detailed information on the employment history are partly aggregated to reduce
the number of variables: In the case of unemployment, the periods 12/31/89 -
12/31/92, 01/01/93 – 12/31/93, 01/01/94 – 08/31/94, 09/01/94 – 02/28/95, 03/01/95
– 08/31/95, 09/01/95 – 11/30/95 and 12/01/95 – 02/29/96 are chosen, taking into
account the changing distances between reference dates. Employment, education,
participation in a programme of the active labour market policy and times without
record are treated the same way. The variables army service and illness are coded
less meticulously due to their less frequent occurrence (12/31/89 – 12/31/93,
01/01/94 – 08/31/95 and 09/01/95 – 02/29/96). The variables for imprisonment are
reduced to one single indicator variable stating whether the respective person was
imprisoned between the 12/13/89 and the 02/29/96 at least one time or not.
The employment history variables are defined relatively to the entry into the
programme. Regarding the participation in a programme and its result, the
employment status immediately before the start of the programme is important. In
case of different starting dates, there is no uniform equivalent to the employment
status one, two, three or more periods before the programme for a comparison
person. An equivalent can be defined only relative to a specific participant or group
of participants with the same starting point.
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All factors that are independent of the start of the programme belong to the group of
the time-invariant variables. These are the variables from Table 2 and the newly
created variables of the employment history. Among the time-variant variables
range those events in the employment history that are defined relatively to the
beginning of the programme by the participants. The inclusion of these time-variant
variables increases the complexity of the analysis. However, this group of variables
improves the matching quality substantially, as the comparisons are now selected in
such a way that they also have a comparable employment history immediately
before the beginning.
Lechner (1999b) proposed a method that is based on a separation of the components
of the propensity score in time-invariant and time-variant variables. In the first step,
the probability of participation is estimated on the basis of time-invariant variables.
In a second step, the estimated (partial) propensity score is used together with the
time-variant variables and possibly a vector of time-invariant variables already
included in the partial propensity score, to determine a distance measure – the so-
called ”Mahalanobis-distance” – between a randomly selected participant and all
non-participants. The non-participant with the smallest Mahalanobis-distance is
stored in a new file together with the participant (matched pair), and both are
removed from the original file. The second step is repeated until no participants are
left in the original file.
Step 1: Estimation of the propensity score using the time-invariant variables only
On the basis of “data set 2” a probit model for the participation probability was
estimated. For this purpose, all time-invariant variables are available. The variables
involved for the final specification are depicted in Table 3 (numbers 1 – 22, 24 -
30). Variables with coefficients significant at the 5 % level, are marked with an “*”.
Due to the pre-selection it is only to a very limited extent possible to infer the
determinants of participation in NPT from the coefficient estimates. Hence, these
estimates are not presented. The probit model was tested against omitted variables,
heteroscedasticity, and non-normality. There were no hints on possible
misspecifications.
The matching algorithm presented in the next step can only be successful if the joint
distribution of these variables between the two groups shows a sufficiently large
overlap. Figure 3 shows the absolute frequencies of the propensity score for the
group of participants (solid line) and the potential comparison group (dotted line).
With the exception of few observations at the right margin of the distribution, the
participants are covered completely by the comparison observations.
19
In this step, pairs of participants and comparisons are matched that are as similar to
each other as possible concerning all relevant variables. For this purpose,
participant i  is selected randomly from the N t  participants. Then, in relation to the
individual date of joining the NPTA, the time-variant variables are calculated for all
potential comparison observations. This allows a calculation of the distance to the
participant according to the formula '),,ˆ('),,ˆ(),( iuimNivjujmNjvijd ββ −=  for each
comparison person j , with Nvβˆ  being the index of the propensity score estimated by
the probit model, mj  the vector of the time-variant variables and u j  the vector of the
time-invariant variables for each comparison person j . The variables of the
participant are indexed with i .
Figure 3: Distribution of Nvβˆ  for participants and comparisons
Note: #=number of observations, Nvβˆ :  index of the propensity score.
Step 2: Matching on the basis of the partial propensity score, time-variant variables
and selected time-invariant variables
Now the person is selected from the pool of all potential comparisons who has the
smallest Mahalanobis-distance m j i d j i W d j i( , ) ( , ) ( , )'=  to the participant i , with W
being the inverse of the covariance matrix of '),,ˆ( umv Nβ  calculated on the basis of all
potential comparison observations. The comparison selected and the participant are
stored in the new “data set 3”, with the comparison person being given a new index
k  (= i ). The entire process is repeated until for each N t  participants one comparison
observation was found.
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Table 3: Comparison of selected time-invariant variables between participants and the
comparison group after matching
No. Variable
Mean
TWs
Mean
comp.
group
Bias
(3)-(4)
Bias in
%
P-value
in %**
(V. 1)
P-value
in %**
(V. 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 Gender (male) 0.776 0.739 0.037 8.7 48 30
2 Impaired health influencing the reintegration success 0.119 0.127 -0.007 -2.3 85 82
3 Relocated expatriate from Eastern Europe 0.127 0.142 -0.015 -4.4 72 64
4 Never started a vocational education 0.403 0.418 -0.015 -3.0 80 81
5 Vocational education started but not completed 0.127 0.149 -0.022 -6.5 60 58
6* Registered with the employment office district ofBad Kreuznach 0.134 0.127 0.007 2.2 86 74
7* Registered with the employment office district ofTrier 0.224 0.201 0.022 5.5 66 26
8* Impaired health and registered with the labour headoffice of Trier 0.097 0.090 0.007 2.6 83 57
9* Registered with the employment office of Speyer 0.448 0.448 0.000 0.0 100 100
10* Registered with a head office of one of the employmentoffice districts 0.425 0.418 0.007 1.5 90 84
11* Reporting failure 1995 0.075 0.067 0.007 2.9 81 78
12 Unempl. duration 12/01/95 – 02/29/96 (in ½ months) 4.403 4.687 -0.284 -12.3 32 9
13* Unempl. duration 09/01/95 – 11/30/95 (in ½ mths.) 3.731 3.866 -0.134 -5.1 68 56
14* Unempl. duration 09/01/94 – 02/28/95 (in mths.) 2.269 2.590 -0.321 -11.9 33 31
15 Unempl. duration 01/01/93 – 12/31/93 (in ½ yrs.) 0.560 0.627 -0.067 -8.2 50 47
16 Unempl. duration 12/31/89 – 12/31/92 (in ½ yrs.) 1.000 0.963 0.037 2.0 87 86
17 Employment Duration 09/01/94 – 02/28/95 (in mths.) 2.254 2.060 0.194 7.2 55 50
18* Empl. Duration as unskilled worker 09/01/94 – 02/28/95(in mths.) 1.299 1.410 -0.112 -4.8 70 67
19 Education duration 12/01/95–02/29/96 (in ½ mths.) 0.082 0.112 -0.030 -4.4 72 42
20 Duration of non-availability of the unemployed to theemployment office 12/01/95 – 02/29/96 (in ½ mths.) 0.291 0.291 0.000 0.0 100 100
21* Duration of illness 01/01/94 – 08/31/95 (in mths.) 0.336 0.425 -0.090 -6.7 58 57
22* Duration of participation in active labour market policy01/01/94 – 08/31/95 (in mths.) 0.567 0.515 0.052 3.1 80 76
23 Propensity score -1.125 -1.186 0.062 11.4 35 0.2
24 Age 3.282 3.320 -0.038 -4.0 74 63
25 Marital status 2.060 2.060 0.000 0.0 100 100
26 Number of children 0.515 0.470 0.045 5.3 67 52
27 Severe disablement 0.067 0.052 0.015 6.3 61 16
28 Vocational indicator (2-digit-level) 52.28 52.65 -0.366 -1.6 89 84
29 Unemployed on 02/29/96 0.791 0.821 -0.030 -7.5 54 25
30 Imprisonment 0.030 0.022 0.007 4.7 70 32
Source: coArb, own calculations.
Notes: *Influence of the variables on the propensity score is significant at the 5 % level. **Significance level
for mutual t-test of the hypothesis that the mean differences in both groups are the same. Variables in bold
print are used in the preselection and are included into the matching algorithm as well.
Matching is regarded as successful if the distributions of the relevant variables in
the group of participants and the comparison group do not differ significantly. Here,
this is the case for the means of both the time-invariant variables and the time-
variant variables (see Tables 3 and 4). Table 3 contains the mean values of the time-
invariant variables for the group of the participants (column 3) and for the
comparison group (column 4). Column 5 states the absolute and column 6 the
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relative differences of these means. The p-values of columns 7 and 8 indicate
whether these deviations are significantly different from zero or not (see Lechner,
1999a). Overall the differences are rather small and not significantly different from
zero. When looking at the propensity score as a summary measure a significant
difference appears with respect to one of the tests, but note that a difference of
estimated quantities is tested without adjusting the distribution of the statistic
accordingly. A more sensible test for the overall match quality is a Wald-test for all
variables used to estimate the propensity score. This test cannot reject the
hypothesis that the distribution of the 22 variables included have the same mean in
both groups.
The variables in bold print given in Table 3 were directly included in the Matching-
algorithm. These are both variables which are also considered in the propensity
score and variables which, being based on pre-selected data, have no longer an
influence on participation, but clearly on the potential results. As far as it was not
already mentioned in the context of the propensity score, for all variables the
equality of means cannot be rejected.
Table 4 gives an indication of the quality of the matches with respect to the time-
variant variables of the employment history. The differences of the proportions of
employed people in both groups (column 4) before the programme are not
significant. Since the comparison group and the programme participants do not
differ significantly with respect to X, we conclude that the causal effect can be
consistently estimated by comparing employment histories of both groups after
NPT.
Table 4: The pre-programme history with respect to employment in per cent points
Half-months
before
programme
)1|( =
∧
SYE t
(TWs)
)1|( =
∧
SYE n
(comparison group)
N
∧
θ
(2)-(3)
P-value
in %
Number of
matched pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-13 23.1 14.2 9.0 5.9 134
-12 23.1 16.4 6.7 17 134
-11 19.4 17.2 2.2 64 134
-10 18.7 16.4 2.2 63 134
-9 17.2 13.4 3.7 40 134
-8 17.2 11.9 5.2 23 134
-7 14.2 10.4 3.7 35 134
-6 14.2 11.2 3.0 46 134
-5 14.2 10.4 3.7 35 134
-4 10.4 9.0 1.5 68 134
-3 10.4 9.0 1.5 68 134
-2 11.9 8.2 3.7 31 134
-1 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 134
Source: Own calculations.
Note: P-values for the t-test of the hypothesis that the difference is zero.
22
4 Evaluation results
Success of the programme refers to the transition of the TW into the first labour
market after the stay with the NPTA has ended. We do not regard the very stay with
the agency as success, because the objective laid out in the GPTA is the
reintegration of unemployed into the first labour market and thus creates a clear
hierarchy as to which of these two forms of employment should be preferred.
Success is calculated as the difference between the proportions of the participant
and comparison group that are employed after the programme.
This difference is calculated for different temporary distances to the end of the
programme until 10 half-months (Table 5). There is not a sufficiently long period or
a sufficient number of observations available to assess the longer-term reintegration
effects of NPT (from Table 5, column 6 it becomes obvious that 10 half-months
after the end of the programme only 38 of the initially 134 persons were left).
Furthermore aggregate effects on the reintegration success into the primary labour
market are calculated (Table 6).
Table 5: Period effects on reintegration success into the primary labour market in per cent
points
Half-months
after
programme
)1|( =
∧
SYE t (T
Ws)
)1|( =
∧
SYE n
(comparis. group)
N
∧
θ
(2)-(3)
P-value
in %
Number of
matched pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 18.7 11.9 6.7 13 134
2 23.0 11.5 11.5 1.7 122
3 25.5 11.8 13.6 0.8 110
4 27.4 11.3 16.0 0.3 106
5 27.0 13.0 14.0 1.2 100
6 28.1 14.6 13.5 2.1 96
7 26.7 13.3 13.3 4.0 75
8 26.4 12.5 13.9 3.4 72
9 27.3 12.7 14.5 5.5 55
10 28.9 15.8 13.2 17 38
Note: Effects that are significant at the 5 % level are in bold letters. Reintegration success is measured as
employment in the first labour market. See also note of Table 4.
According to our method for coding the employment histories the distance is
measured in steps of half-months. The earliest effect is determined one half-month,
the latest effect 10 half-months after the end of the programme. Table 5, column 2
contains the proportions of the TWs who after completing their employment with a
NPTA entered the first labour market. Column 3, Table 5 shows the respective
values for the comparison group. The estimates of the causal effects of the
programme are given in column 4. Column 5 contains the significance levels of the
t-tests of the hypothesis that the causal effects equal zero. The respective columns 2,
3 and 4 of Table 6 show the expected total number of half-month of employment
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between the end of the programme and period T. Column 4 contains the causal
effect in terms of the expected length of employment due to NPT.
The percentage of those former TWs having entered the first labour market (Table 5,
column 2) lies above the comparison group (column 3, Table 5) in all the ten points
of time examined. One half-month after the end of the measure, the proportion of
the reintegrated TWs amounts to 18.7 %, while it is only 11.9 % for the comparison
group. After five half-months the percentage rises significantly for both groups, but
for the TWs (27 %) it is again considerably higher than for the comparison group
(13 %). Also 10 half-months after the end of the programme, TWs are more
frequently employed than the comparable non-participants (28.9% compared to
15.8%). The greatest effect (16 %) occurs four half-months after the end of the
programme. With a p-value of 0.3%, the effect is statistically significant. With the
exception of the first and the last two time points the estimated effects are all
significant at the 5 % level.
The aggregate effects on the reintegration success into the primary labour market
are positive and rise up to an amount of 1.1 half-months after eight time periods.
While a member of the comparison group has an expected stay of 0.9 half-months in
the first four months after leaving the NPTA a participants has an expected stay of 2
half-months (Table 6). This effect is statistically significant at the 5 % level.
Table 6: Aggregate effects on reintegration success into the primary labour market
Half-months
after
programme
)1|( =
∧
SYE t
(TWs)
)1|( =
∧
SYE n (compar
is. group)
N
∧
θ
(2)-(3)
P-value
in %
Number of
matched pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 0.19 0.12 0.07 13 134
2 0.43 0.22 0.21 1.7 122
3 0.68 0.34 0.34 0.8 110
4 0.95 0.46 0.49 0.3 106
5 1.24 0.58 0.66 1.2 100
6 1.51 0.70 0.81 2.1 96
7 1.65 0.83 0.83 4.0 75
8 2.00 0.90 1.10 3.4 72
9 2.02 1.07 0.95 5.5 55
10 2.61 1.42 1.18 17 38
Note: The outcome in period T is measured as the sum of outcomes of periods 1 to T as defined in the
previous tables. This quantity is estimated using only individuals observed in all periods 1 to T. The
estimated effect can be interpreted as the expected total number of half-months of employment between the
end of the programme and period T that are due to the programmes. See notes of Tables 4 and 5.
As a central result it can be stated that despite its low absolute reintegration rate -
compared to the rate of 46.5 % that has been measured for public training
programmes (see Blaschke and Nagel, 1995), the NPT can be attributed a certain
success with the reintegration of problem groups into the primary labour market. On
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average, the effect of participation for the first five months after the end of the
programme is about 13 % compared to non-participation. Furthermore unemployed
participating in the programme have an expected aggregated stay in the first labour
market more than half a month longer than non-participants. That is in the first four
months after participation the effect of NPT is 1.1 half-months. The relative high
intensive supervision of the TWs as well as the presumably more direct addressing
of enterprises by the agencies in comparison with the FES has been particularly
successful in the tight labour market for problem groups. By the employment of
unemployed and their hiring out, many TWs get the opportunity to create a good
impression with a potential future employer. Another explanation for the relative
success is that NPTAs possess especially good information on employment
opportunities for long-term unemployed.
5 Concluding remarks
The aim of the study was to assess the direct impact of publicly subsidised NPTAs
on the entry success of unemployed into the primary labour market, part of them
belonging to the group of hard-to-place persons.
GPTA was a small programme both from the money spend and from the impacts it
had. It did not change the labour market perspectives on the group of the roughly
50,000 hard-to-place unemployed in Rhineland-Palatinate much. However, it had a
positive net impact at the local micro level in that it improved the situation of
roughly 100 unemployed which otherwise not would have incurred.
For a comprehensive evaluation of the GPTA programme of the FES  more
extensive analyses would be required that should include other direct impacts (for
example on earnings; on longer term impacts; on participants reduced use of social
welfare etc.), indirect impacts (for example on non-participants and through the
forgone use of the money invested) and the longer perspective of the NPTAs (none
was out of business in April 1997) in the evaluation. Another future research topic
would be a comparison of temp agencies with alternative programmes for the
reintegration of unemployed, such as programmes of further or re-education or
wage subsidies, which are in fact in wider use or comparison with the recently
introduced job placements premia according to the so-called “Maatwerk”-method,
where commercial agencies get premia for a successful placement of hard-to-place
persons. Such comparisons based on suitable comparison groups can contribute to
improve the understanding of the effectiveness of alternative programmes of active
labour market policy.
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6 Appendix
Table A1: Example of a hypothetic employment history in the coArb
No. of
entry
From To Code Event Position or other entries
1 25 Nov 96 A Alo-Meld.13, Alg-WB-
Antrag14
2 12 Nov 96 24 Nov 96 o.N.15
3 24 Okt 96 11 Nov 96 Fa.16 XXX
4 01 Oct 96 23 Oct 96 In NPTA
5 08 Apr 96 30 Sep 96 Fa. XXX Warehouse worker
6 01 Apr 96 05 Apr 96 Fa. XXX Unskilled construction
worker
7 14 Dec 95 A Alo-meld. WB-Antrag17
8 06 Dec 95 A Alo-Meldung WB-Antragstellung
9 23 Nov 95 13 Dec 95 krank geschrieben18
10 Jun 95 20 Nov 95 XXX forklifter, production
hand
11 30 Oct 95 1.MV19 301095/ 2.MV
091195
12 03 Apr 95 A Alo-Meldung WB-Antragstellung
13 15 Mar 95 31 Mar 95 krank20
14 01 Sep 94 15 Mar 95 + Fa. XXX wurde am 210195 weiterbesch.21
15 27 Jan 95 1.MV 270195/ 2.MV
090295
16 26 Jan 95 A Alo-meld. WB-Antrag
17 21 Jan 95 25 Jan 95 o.N.
18 01 Sep 94 20 Jan 95 + Fa. XXX Locksmith
19 01 Jul 94 A Alo-Meldg. 130694 Alg-
Antrag
20 01 Jul 93 30 Jun 94 + Fa. XXX Warehouse worker
21 91 93 Fa. XXX Resocialisation
22 88 90 Fa. XXX Metal industry
Source: coArb database; note: The entries in the table were made up by the ZEW after really existing
employment histories in the coArb; WB=Weiterbildung, MV=Meldeversäumnis, o.N. ohne Nachweis.
                                          
13 Registered unemployed.
14 Application for general further education.
15 No records.
16 Company.
17 Application for general further education.
18 Sick leave.
19 Reporting failure.
20 Ill.
21 Was re-employed on 21/01/1995.
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Table A2: Example of a coded employment history
Half-
month
Reference date/
half-months
Code* Reference date/
months
Code* Reference date/
half-months
Code*
20 31 Dec 96 0 31 Jul 95 11 30 Jun 93 11
19 16 Dec 96 0 30 Jun 95 11 31 Dec 92 5
18 30 Nov 96 0 31 May 95 0 30 Jun 92 5
17 16 Nov 96 91 30 Apr 95 0 31 Dec 91 5
16 31 Oct 96 11 31 Mar 95 93 30 Jun 91 5
15 16 Oct 96 71 28 Feb 95 131 31 Dec 90 11
14 30 Sep 96 0 31 Jan 95 131 30 Jun 90 11
13 16 Sep 96 11 31 Dec 94 131 31 Dec 89 11
12 31 Aug 96 11 30 Nov 94 131
11 16 Aug 96 11 31 Oct 94 131
10 31 Jul 96 11 30 Sep 94 131
9 16 Jul 96 11 31 Aug 94 0
8 30 Jun 96 11 31 Jul 94 0
7 16 Jun 96 11 30 Jun 94 11
6 31 May 96 11 31 May 94 11
5 16 May 96 11 30 Apr 94 11
4 30 Apr 96 11 31 Mar 94 11
3 16 Apr 96 11 28 Feb 94 11
2 31 Mar 96 0 31 Jan 94 11
1 16 Mar 96 0 31 Dec 93 11
29 Feb 96 0
16 Feb 96 0
31 Jan 96 0
16 Jan 96 0
31 Dec 95 0
16 Dec 95 0
30 Nov 95 93
16 Nov 95 11
31 Oct 95 11
16 Oct 95 11
30 Sep 95 11
16 Sep 95 11
31 Aug 95 11
Source: Own representation based on the coArb and the hypothetic employment history of person xxx. *0 =
unemployment, 91 = no records, 1... = employment in the first labour market differentiated according to the
skill level of the activity, 71 = NPTA, 93 = illness, 5 =rehabilitation.
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